Home News What is Ramaphosa’s obsession with a State of Disaster?

What is Ramaphosa’s obsession with a State of Disaster?

by Zahid Jadwat

Nearly half of President Cyril Ramaphosa’s time in office has consisted of a State of Disaster. Even as his term winds to an end, the president is once again contemplating the declaration of another State of Disaster, this time to deal with the energy crisis that has prompted rolling blackouts for every day of 2023 so far.

The first declaration of a national State of Disaster, under Section 27(1) of the Disaster Management Act (2002), was the Ramaphosa government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic. It was at the time a largely favourable move in the eye of the public as it was a demonstration of decisive action in a time of impending crisis.

This time around, things are different. The public holds apprehension towards any potential State of Disaster. The far-reaching impacts of such a declaration, insofar as curtailing democratic rights present pertinent lessons for South Africans. Add to that the flagrant malfeasance that was enabled by and flourished through the State of Disaster, and our hesitance is all the more reasonable. We learnt our lesson.

But what is it with the Ramaphosa administration and its ardour for a State of Disaster? From the onset of the first declaration, to the successive extensions that prolonged it, there has been an eagerness to run the country outside of the existing legal framework. Perhaps a part of the answer lies in historical deprivation and, later, erosion of institutional capacity, while the other part might lie in the sluggishness that has become a prominent feature of the Ramaphosa presidency.

 

SMread: National State of Disaster could create more problems than solutions


Institutional capacity

 


A state with well-functioning services requires strong institutional capacity. This is typically defined as the ability of an organisation, government, or any other institution to effectively carry out its responsibilities, functions, and objectives.

Considered in the broader South African context, such institutional capacity is sometimes nonexistent and mostly inadequate for usual circumstances, nevermind times of crisis. Applied to the context of the Covid-19 pandemic that even strained developed nations, it is easy to understand how (1) decades of unequal distribution of resources and development of facilities as well as (2) years of neglect might have left South Africa ill-prepared to deal with the health crisis. In that sense, a carefully-considered State of Disaster might have been our best shot at survival.

Once again, when considering institutional capacity, apprehension towards another State of Disaster – this time to deal with Eskom – is reasonable. The context of the energy crisis is different from that of inadequate institutional capacity in the healthcare sector. This is because South Africa’s institutional problems in healthcare stem from systematic inequality and thus predate ANC-rule, while the energy crisis is arguably a disaster of their own making.

It is an established fact that underdevelopment in non-white spaces was a part of apartheid architecture. Health facilities comparable to First World infrastructure were easily accessible to whites, while people in townships lived a different experience. We know that. Come 1994, when these facilities became accessible to a much larger population, it was clear that the infrastructure was insufficient. In this regard, it is possible to maintain that the democratic government got off on the backfoot. The sweeping powers afforded by a State of Disaster somehwhat assisted the government in safeguarding a fragile healthcare system.

However, this cannot be applied to the case of energy infrastructure. The early 1980s saw construction begin on Lethabo, Matimba and Kendal power stations – all of which were completed before 1994. These substantial investments in electricity generation powered up the country more than it needed at the time. At this point, it must be noted, the economy was at a low. During that decade as a whole, it had grown by a meagre 1,3 percent a year. This meant more power on the grid for industrialisation that never happened. If anything, Mandela’s government inherited an abundance of power supply and thus had a head start.

Fastforward some nearly-30 years later, with impressive economic growth between the first two decades of democracy together with population growth in the same period, we find a country facing regular power blackouts. Aged power stations take turns in the ICU ward and those surviving units barely manage to keep the lights on. Except, this could have been avoided if early warning signs – as far back as 1997 – were heeded.

Returning to institutional capacity and the declaration of a State of Disaster, especially vis-a-vis loadshedding, there is much to suggest institutional capacity was and still is there to address the issue. The problem then lies with a lack of political and governmental will, which brings us to the topic of Ramaphosa’s notorious hesitance to take action.

 

SMread: Privatising SOEs is not the way to save South Africa


Consensus-seeking

Anyone who paid attention to South African politics at least in the last five years would know how frustratingly slow President Cyril Ramaphosa’s consensus-seeking approach to resolving matters can be. This perception is compounded by heightened expectations of immediate change when the euphoria of a ‘New Dawn’ swept from Cape Town to Musina and Richards Bay to Yzerfontein.

The declaration of a State of Disaster, as Lawson Naidoo from CASAC pointed out in a recent TV interview, provides an opportunity to demonstrate the seriousness of a government’s approach. The Covid-19 pandemic came two years into his time in Union Buildings. Many had naively anticipated corrupt officials would have been jailed by then, but this was not the case. It makes sense then that a State of Disaster being declared would be perceived as ‘decisive action’.

A State of Disaster demands interministerial cooperation, which makes sense why it would appear to be a good option from Ramaphosa’s point of view. He is reluctant to take action on his own, and therefore the nature of governance under a State of Disaster appears to be attractive. What he fails to realise, however, is that South Africans want action.

This is not a case where there is insufficient room to deal with the energy crisis within the existing framework, just decisions needing to be taken. While there generally is an appreciation for consensus-seeking, the sluggishness of the approach allow opportunities for decisive action – what South Africans really want – to fly by.

In conclusion, Cyril Ramaphosa’s term has been characterised by a State of Disaster, with another one on the cards bringing it close to becoming a dominant feature of his presidency. While they do afford an opportunity for action, there is nothing to indicate that declaring a State of Disaster over the energy crisis would yield any significant difference, except that it provides a fresh opportunity for corruption to fester yet again.

Related Videos